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Abstract
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) such as
Blockchain have been heralded for their potential to fundamentally disrupt traditional industries and longstanding practices in private and public businesses. In the financial sectors, for example, quite a number of novel financial technology (FinTech) services based on
DLT/Blockchain have been introduced with cryptocurrencies representing prominent cases. While the already
highly regulated financial sectors have emerged as early
targets for DLT/Blockchain induced disruption, a diverse
set of other areas, such as healthcare record keeping, insurance record keeping, industrial and retail supply
chain management, property registries, citizen identification systems, and voting systems to name a few, has
also come into the focus of DLT/Blockchain innovation.
These new types of services might be in need of both complementary and novel regulations for DLT/Blockchainbased services. Interestingly, smaller jurisdictions such
as Gibraltar, Malta, and Liechtenstein were among the
first to provide advice and regulation for DLT/Blockchain service provisions. The study compares these early
regulatory approaches to each other and discusses the
prospects of DLT/Blockchain service regulation based on
the study’s findings. DLT/Blockchain service regulation
appears to incorporate predominantly principle-based
rather than rule-based regulations, which makes the regulation enforcement a uniquely individual case-based
task.

1. Introduction
Initially, when Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
debuted in the first decade of the 21st century its overall
disruptive potential remained widely uncovered. Only
with the advent and success of cryptocurrencies, which
are based on Blockchain, a DLT implementation, the
unique and broad capabilities of the technology became
more widely understood [28]. Post-hoc non-falsifiability
or immutability of transactional records, security of
transactions in an append-only ledger-type environment,
transparency of transactions, and reduction of transaction
costs as a result of the former three characteristics were
among
the
distinguishing
capabilities
of
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DLT/Blockchain [14, 22, 25, 28, 31]. Moreover, via smart
contracts based on predefined algorithms DLT-based
transactions could be automatically executed in case the
contractual conditions were satisfied, which would further
drive down transaction costs and speed up the transactional process. In the financial sector, the implications of
cryptocurrencies and also smart contracting were quickly
understood also with regard to their quality to eliminate
the need for services from central counterparties such as
banks [14].
Forced by the success of unregulated cryptocurrencies
and other DLT-based financial technology (FinTech) services, which had grown to a sizable global economic entity
by the mid of the second decade of the 21st century, lawmakers and regulators around the world began to investigate the options for regulating the novel phenomena for
reasons of gaining control over DLT-based money flows
(in terms of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing interests) as well as for establishing baseline security and protection for investors and investments [3, 7,
19, 21, 24, 34].
While large jurisdictions such as the Federal Government of the United States (US) and the European Union
(EU) as well as other nation states have either taken a caseby-case approach like the US, or have been intentionally
slow in deliberating, crafting, and agreeing on explicit
overall DLT service-related regulations, a few smaller jurisdictions such as Gibraltar, a self-governed overseas territory of the United Kingdom (UK), the EU member state
of Malta, and more recently the EU associate Principality
of Liechtenstein have moved more quickly towards formal
hearings on proposed DLT service-related legislation and
regulation. Finally, in quick succession respective regulations went into effect in 2018 in Gibraltar and Malta. We
would have liked to include the also self-governed British
island of Bermuda in this study. While we collected comprehensive documentation on Bermuda’s regulation of
DLT-related service provisions, we were unable to persuade any of Bermuda’s stakeholders to be part of this
study as interviewees, which prevented arriving at a multistakeholder perspective on the nature of the regulation, its
motivations and expectations along with other clarifications and interpretations of the regulatory effort in the case
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of Bermuda. Therefore, we finally refrained from including the case in this project.
This study explores the nature of the respective regulations, their objectives and expectations as seen by regulators, as well as their effects on DLT service providers.
In comparing the early regulation attempts and their already observable effects the study aims at better understanding the regulatory choices and challenges as well as
the potentially enabling and constraining outcomes of
various regulatory approaches on DLT-based services.
The paper is organized as follows: First, the academic literature on DLT/Blockchain provider regulation
is reviewed followed by a presentation of the resulting
research questions and the methodology section. Subsequently, the study findings are detailed leading to the
discussion of insights from the findings. At last, conclusions are drawn, and the directions for future research on
the subject are sketched out.

2. Literature Review
The academic literature on the regulation of
DLT/Blockchain providers and service provision is still
relatively small. While the term “regulation” itself has
received different interpretations [21], in which some
authors relate to a fixed set of hard rules, the compliance
to which requires adequate enforcement, others see in
regulation the willful causation of desirable behavior
within certain boundaries. Some debate has ensued regarding the appropriateness of legal and/or regulatory
provisions for technology itself rather than for the framing of productive uses of technology and for preventing
harmful ones. Digital technology, it has been argued, develops too fast and changes too quickly such that any
regulatory efforts targeted at the technology itself and its
specificities might be outright ineffective, be outdated
quickly, or even have undesirable and stifling side effects on the technological progress [21]. In that context,
Moses quotes Eastbrook’s 1996 argument, in which the
judge refers exempli gratia to an imaginary “Law of the
Horse,” which would be impossible to effectively formulate for sake of its endlessly enumerable instantiations [21]. Furthermore, as Moses also holds, regulators
face the twin hurdles, one of which is the so-called Collingridge dilemma according to which in the early stage
of digital technology evolution, any regulation would be
highly speculative in the absence of unknowable outcomes with or without regulation, while at a later stage
with more mature new-technology uses the regulation
might become overly disruptive to the evolved statusquo [6]. The other hurdle is given by the “uncertainty
paradox” according to which the assessment of risks regarding regulatory outcomes as opposed to those outcomes under no regulation would be equally unknowable at the time of regulation [15].

In the rapidly evolving FinTech sector, novel uses
based on DLT/Blockchain technology, for example, the
creation of crypto-currencies and their trading on DLTbased exchange platforms, have so far greatly outpaced
undertakings to provide legal or regulatory frameworks
[23]. Lastra & Allen point at the three border problems
that any regulation of cyber services has to address: (a)
the need for distinguishing the regulated from the unregulated activities and the so-called contagion problem in
case of crossovers between the two realms, (b) the need
for identifying the realm and reach of a regulation, which
is enacted by a jurisdiction on national or sub-national
levels, and (c) the need for identifying the realm and reach
of a regulation, which pertains to services provided in cyberspace and the “real world” [20]. Three distinct areas
of potential regulation have been identified, (a) virtual or
crypto currencies, (b) initial coin offerings (ICOs) and
crypto tokens, and (c) smart contracts [5].
Crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin and Ether have received differential legal treatments from jurisdictions
around the world, which range from strict prohibition
over legally considering them assets or commodities representing some exchange value all the way to regarding
them as quasi-money, however, without legal tender status [5, 12, 16, 17]. In the latter cases, globally well-established frameworks such as anti-money laundering (AML)
and combating financing terrorists (CFT) would apply
also to these DLT/Blockchain-based services [12, 16].
ICOs and crypto tokens have also been legally treated
by jurisdictions in a similarly large range of ways from
entire banning (China, South Korea) to considering them
securities or commodities under existing laws on a case
by case basis (US, Switzerland) to some regulation (Gibraltar, Canada), to not regulating them at all [5, 20].
Beyond the quasi-monetary or security-type instantiations of crypto-currencies, academic accounts of regulatory needs have pointed at DLT service areas such as media of exchange, payment rails [20], and notarial, that is,
non-monetary uses [14] such as document verification,
authorship authentication, and contract enforcement [19]
as well as title registries, licensing services, authentication/identity services, health insurance record keeping [1,
4, 17], asset registries, application stacks, or other assetcentric technologies [23] among others [14]. As Siegel
outlines, digital tokens have four distinct characteristics:
They may be either (a) fungible and transferable (for example, like coupons or tickets, or (b) fungible and nontransferable like club memberships or application accounts, or (3) unique and transferable such as lottery tickets or car titles, or (4) unique and non-transferable such
as driver’s licenses or drug prescriptions [29]. Regulation
of tokens and token-related services, hence, needs to account for these characteristics and use cases.
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Smart contracts, tightly related to crypto-currencies,
ICOs/tokens, represent another new realm and target of
potential DLT-related service regulation. Smart contracts typically embed algorithms in digital tokens,
which under predefined conditions automatically execute legally binding transactions such as payments or
transfer of ownership of digital assets. Regulatory efforts and assessments need to clarify to what extent common law covers such algorithmic agreements, or in turn,
comply with existing laws, or assume a legal standing
on their own [5]
Overall, regulation and licensure along all these lines
are seen as enablers for DLT/Blockchain provision by
decreasing legal risks for licensed providers and safety,
fraud, and mishandling risks on part of service recipients
[19].
However, as Zetsche et al [36] emphasize, whatever
regulated DLT-based service is provided, legal liabilities (and associated risk-related costs) will not vanish.
Rather four dimensions of legal liability have to be considered in regulated DLT-based service provision, since
these might be sources of risk proliferation: (1) liability
as a result of breach of contract (for example, in a permissioned ledger between the partners), (2) liability resulting from a partner’s control rights (again in permissioned ledgers), (3) case-specific liability even in unpermissioned ledgers, and (4) legal entanglement from joint
liability when operating across jurisdictions with different liability statutes.
Furthermore, as Ramsay observes, DLT/Blockchain
principles of operation and their regulation might create
a Gordian legal knot when it comes to tension and outright conflict between (regulated) DLT/Blockchain service provision and other regulations such as the EU’s
latest General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of
2018 [24], the latter of which grants to individuals and
institutions the per-request right to erasure, rectification,
and restriction of processing of personal data, which
would be a technically unfeasible task to perform on any
permissionless distributed ledger and still a daunting one
on permissioned distributed ledgers depending on the
number of nodes.
In summary, most of the legal and regulatory territory around DLT/Blockchain service provision, in general, and around crypto-currencies, ICOs/tokens, and
smart contracts, in particular, is uncharted, and, maybe
even unchartable under a traditional regulatory approach. It also appears that in the absence of some level
of regulatory harmonization on a global scale,
DLT/Blockchain service provision might remain a riskheavy undertaking. Insofar, regulatory initiatives such
as the ones investigated in this comparative study might
help pave the path to the better understanding of

challenges and opportunities of regulation in this area and
its potential for legal harmonization.

3. Research Questions
This then leads to the following research questions:
Research Question #1 (RQ#1):
How do the investigated regulatory approaches compare?
Research Question #2 (RQ#2):
What are motivations and challenges for regulating
DLT providers/provision at an early stage?
Research Question #3 (RQ#3):
How are the identified challenges addressed in the
various approaches of early regulations?

4. Method Section
Approach. Comparative case studies have been a preferred method of investigation, when the phenomena under study were theoretically not yet well understood and
the expected accumulation of knowledge rested on particular contexts [11] within real-life social settings [35]. By
searching for motives, reasons, potential causes as well as
for ways, means, and manners of actors’ relationships and
actions within the phenomena under investigation the resulting rich descriptive accounts in comparative case
studies reach for theory development or theory revision
[9, 11, 35].
Instrument and Coding Scheme. The literature on
regulatory benefits and challenges in the DLT/Blockchain realm informed the development of a semi-structured interview protocol in four topical areas of (1) general information, (2) perceptions of and motivations for
DLT provider/provision regulation, (3) state of legislative
and regulatory process, and (4) challenges and outlook
within the broader context of DLT provider/provision
regulation. The instrument incorporated a total of fifteen
interview questions along with thirty anticipatory subquestions for further probing.
Sample. After the British overseas territory Gibraltar
had incorporated a worldwide first DLT provider/provision regulation in early 2018, which was studied separately, the jurisdictions of Malta and Liechtenstein were
the next to follow with DLT/Blockchain regulations. In a
purposive sampling approach [26], a total of twenty individuals from the three jurisdictions (Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, and Malta) representing primary stakeholders such
as regulators, government officials, legal advisors, lobbyists, FinTech firms, developers, and licensees, were identified and interviewed in person.
Data Collection. The two main sources of data collection were the regulatory documents and the in-person
interviews. Interviews were conducted either in person or
via an industry-grade and encrypted videoconferencing
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tool (Zoom, version 4.1.34801.1116) between late fall
of 2018 and spring of 2019. The interviews lasted between 41 and 99 minutes with an average of 62 minutes
and a median of 69 minutes. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded for analysis. Furthermore,
interviewers took notes during the interviews. Besides
the legal documents other documents such as press interviews were collected, reviewed, and coded as appropriate.
Data Analysis and Coding. The codebook followed
the questionnaire regarding the breakdown of (1) main
questions and sub-questions (2) perceptions of and motivations for DLT provider/provision regulation, (3)
state of legislative and regulatory process, and (4) challenges and outlook within the broader context of DLT
provider/provision regulation producing initially 15 category codes and 30 sub-category codes. Additional
codes were inductively introduced during data collection, in individual coding sessions, and inter-coder sessions [27, 30, 32]. Since a codebook in a hybrid approach of deductive and inductive analyses [10] is designed to be open to extension, it ultimately encompassed 57 sub-category codes in the four main categories. Whenever evidence from the data supported it, relationship links between concepts were established,
which were not interpreted as causal links.

5. Findings
5.1 Ad research question #1 (How do the investigated regulatory approaches compare?):
Gibraltar, while still a part of the European Union
(EU) before the United Kingdom’s leaving the EU
(Brexit), was the first jurisdiction to regulate the provision of DLT-based services. The respective law went
into force on January 1, 2018 as Financial Services (Distributed Ledger Technology Providers) Regulations
2017, legal notice No. 204. The legislation amended previous financial-sector regulations such as the Principal
Act as well as the Financial Services (Licensing) Regulations of 1991, the Financial Services (Penalty Fees)
Regulations of 1993, and Financial Services (Fees) Regulations of 2016. The DLT Provider Regulation of 2017
defined DLT-based services as a “way of business” that
uses “distributed ledger technology for storing and
transmitting value belongings to others” (p. 2481). It
further defines DLT as “a database system in which (a)
information is recorded and consensually shared and
synchronized across a network of multiple nodes; and
(b) all copies of the database are regarded as equally authentic” (p. 2481). Additionally, “value” is defined as to
include “assets, holdings and other forms of ownership,
rights or interests, with or without related information,
such as agreements or transactions for the transfer of
value or its payment, clearing or settlement” (p. 2481).

The Gibraltar regulation, hence, provides a vast umbrella
definition of value stored and transferred via DLT, which
can contain anything from securities over commodities to
ownership rights of physical objects such as pieces of art,
which would normally not fall under the jurisdiction of
the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission (GFSC).
The Gibraltar DLT Provider Regulation is unique in that
it refrained from addressing information technology in
any specific terms other than the most general and neutral. It is also unique in its desistance from specifying any
hard rules, with which DLT licensees have to comply. It
rather lists nine principles, which include (1) honesty and
integrity of business conduct, (2) due regard to customer
needs and fair communications, (3) adequacy of resources, (4) effective management and control, also with
regard to risk, (5) effective protective arrangements, (6)
effective governance arrangements, (7) system security,
(8) systems of detection and prevention of crime, and (9)
provisions for orderly wind down of business.
While the regulation leaves room for non-financial
uses of DLT service provision, its regulatory home was
seen under the roof of the GFSC, which vets DLT provider applications and grants DLT provider licenses. The
GSFC has sweeping powers in licensing, monitoring, and
enforcing compliance with DLT-based and traditional financial services. GFSC also enjoys flexibility and a wide
range of interpretative space for assessing and evaluating
the soundness and viability of the business of any given
DLT provider licensee. Throughout the first year of the
regulation in force (2018) a total of four licenses were
granted, the businesses of three of which were in operation in the crypto exchange market arena, and another
dozen licenses were close to being granted in the first half
of 2019.
Interestingly, despite, or, rather because of the wide
definition of DLT-based service provision, Gibraltar legislators felt compelled to formulate a proposal for a “Token Regulation,” which compensates for the existing lack
of token-specific regulation (see Gibraltar Finance,
http://gibraltarfinance.gi/20180309-token-regulation--policy-document-v2.1-final.pdf, accessed September 21,
2018). The respective regulation was expected to pass the
Gibraltar Parliament in the fall of 2018; however, it has
since been stuck in the process.
Liechtenstein, a European Area (EA), that is, EU-associated country, had entered (by early June 2019—the
time of this writing) the stages of parliamentary proceedings for a comprehensive and detailed regulation of services forming a “token economy” built upon so-called
“trustworthy technologies” [13]. The interviewees expected that the respective comprehensive regulation
would be passed and in force by January of 2020. While
other jurisdictions more narrowly focus their regulations
and proposals for regulation on the area of financial
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services and also in some cases touch on technologyspecific aspects of the phenomenon, the Liechtenstein
regulation is deliberately broad and technology neutral.
While it considers unique characteristics of Blockchain
technology as examples, the proposed legislation refers
to digital services based on “trustworthy technologies,”
which extend far beyond financial assets such as currencies and securities into values including utility coins,
commodities, raw materials, real estate, other physical
objects (in general), patents, copyrights, machinery, and
entitlements, among others. In the Liechtenstein regulatory perspective, the tokenization of these items of value
and ownership provides for the evolution of the socalled “token economy.” For this to materialize, the creation of tokens, which are seen as initially empty “containers,” in and through which whatever tangible or intangible value can be represented, has to be regulated
along with the safe storage and maintenance of such tokens. Furthermore, the regulation has to encompass secure trading and exchange of tokens including public token offerings, general related services, and private investments.
The broad scope of Liechtenstein’s regulation creates numerous points of connection and intersections
with other laws and regulations, which as a consequence
are in need of amendments such as the Due Diligence
Act (anti-money laundering/AML and combating-financing terrorists/CFT) and the Financial Market Supervision Act, which basically gives the Financial Market Authority (FMA) strong oversight over the regulated
token economy as defined by the TVTG (TTTA, that is,
Token and Trusted Technologies Service Provider Law).
Furthermore, amendments had to be made to existing
Civil and Corporate Law to include TVTG-related
“value rights” as well as to the Commercial Law with
regard to TTTA providers. Once in force, the Liechtenstein regulation of DLT/Blockchain/Tokens would be
the most comprehensive of its kind so far.
Malta, a EU member state, has a history of successfully attracting business opportunities like Gibraltar,
which for the lack of conducive and accommodating
legislation have difficulties to develop their full potential elsewhere. Both Malta and Gibraltar competed in developing such legal environments for the unfolding
online gaming businesses as early as the late 1980s. In
both cases, major global players in that particular business segment were attracted to making their operations
home in these regulated environments leading to major
increases of wealth and tax revenue as well as high-technology know-how influx in the two jurisdictions. With
the appearance of cryptocurrencies, businesses and lawmakers in both jurisdictions understood early that a similar opportunity was likely at hand. The approach, which
Malta has taken, however, is different from the two
aforementioned ones. With much fanfare (“Malta, the

Blockchain Island”) three pieces of legislation went into
force in November of 2018. The first, the Virtual Financial Assets Act (VFAA) regulates “the field of Initial Virtual Financial Assets Offerings and Virtual Financial Assets” and related services and matters. It defines a DLT
asset as a virtual token, a virtual financial asset, electronic
money, or a financial instrument (VFAA, cap. 590, p. 3).
In nine major sections and a total of 62 paragraphs VFFA
provides detailed regulations regarding requirements for
licensing, application procedures, administration and obligation of license holders, prevention of abuses, regulatory and investigatory powers, auditing, appeals, sanctions etc., among others. The VFA Act also introduces the
institution of a registered “VFA agent” (VFAA, cap. 590,
p. 6), typically a lawyer, accountant, or auditor (firm)
through whom and which VFA offerings can be licensed.
The VFA Act is accompanied by the Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act (MDIAA), cap 590, and Innovative
Technology Arrangements and Services Act (ITAS), cap
592. While the former act introduces a new supervisory
and advisory authority, the Malta Digital Innovation Authority (MDIA), geared at guiding and supervising the
implementation and uses of novel technologies, the latter
is designed for regulating such novel technologies as need
emerges. DLT Service-related licenses have to clear several hurdles in Malta before they are granted. The technology arrangements need to certified by MDIA under
ITAS, whereas the financial business-related arrangements undergo a review and approval by certified VFA
agents, the license of operation for which is then ultimately granted by the Malta Financial Services Authority. As it appears, the technology certification and the (financial) business certification involve and follow two
separate, but ideally parallel, processes. The MDIA Act
states that an “array of other national competent authorities” might have a say in the certification processes. It will
remain to be seen how effective and time-efficient the
two-pronged certification process works.
In summary, the three regulatory approaches employ
fairly distinct regimes and processes. While Gibraltar was
the first to provide a regulatory framework, it purposefully remained vague and unspecific about technology
and token-related matters, whereas Malta not only implemented a new technology-focused agency, but also involved another intermediary, the VFA agent, into a twopronged certification procedure. Liechtenstein, on the
other hand, envisioned and tried to foster the emergence
of a whole-new token economy with a comprehensive,
however, clear approach that appears to be well integrated
into existing legal frameworks beyond the financial
frameworks.

5.2 Ad research question #2 (What are motivations
and challenges for regulating DLT providers/provision at
an early stage?):
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As will be shown in the following, the motivations
for regulating DLT/Blockchain/Token service providers
as well as the perceived challenges of such regulations
were seen in similar, if not the same ways across the
three jurisdictions, which is why they are presented below forgoing the breakdown used in the previous section
to avoid unnecessary repetition.
In 2017, the year before the regulation in Gibraltar
and Malta went into force, about $6.6b had been raised
in the eleven largest cryptoasset offerings alone in a
global ICO marketplace without much of a legal protection or regulation [18]. Without exception the value of
these crypto holdings had all fallen significantly until
the end of that same year, in some cases by up to 98 percent. Besides the inherent riskiness and volatility of
these particular kinds of investments, however, over 80
percent of cryptoasset projects in terms of number of
shares were identified as scams [8]. It was feared by both
FinTech stakeholders and regulators in the three jurisdictions (Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, and Malta) that the
very high burn rate observed in ICOs and purposefully
abusive uses in permissionless environments could effectively suffocate a novel and highly attractive business
opportunity before it had even fully developed. Regulation, hence, was considered an urgent necessity to prevent that from happening. An equally strong motivation
on part of major stakeholders in the three jurisdictions in
favor of DLT/Blockchain/Token regulation was the desire to move fast and decisively for seizing what was
considered a unique and rapidly emerging business opportunity before larger jurisdictions would be able to put
their own respective stakes in the ground. Bolstered and
enabled by their relatively small sizes, manageable number of stakeholders, and arm-length decision-making
processes the three jurisdictions enjoy high degrees of
agility and flexibility that make such early and fast legislative moves possible. This, in turn, was expected to
attract serious and reputable businesses in the evolving
FinTech sector and adjacent service areas by establishing legal certainty along with secure and safe operational settings for cryptoasset exchanges and other DLTbased service provisions. Explains a Gibraltar government official,
“If there is no framework, and there is no control,
and there is no transparency, it is going to crash
and burn. So, we have taken the view, let us allow
it, but control it, regulate it, and ensure that everybody is involved in it and knows what they are doing... By regulating we brought the good ones in
and kept the bad ones out. They have got to go
through the Financial Services Commission, pay
fees, invest in the place by putting people here and
by putting offices here. And that is going to push

away the bulk of people that we do not want here.”
(quote #01)
However, other motivations also included the prospect of and potential for reforming the financial and
other service arenas via groundbreaking innovations
with the hope of making markets more equitably accessible. As a Liechtenstein regulator holds,
“One of the big visions...is to democratize financial services again. Now you have the financial
services in the hands of a few powerful players.
And in the future, every small- or medium-sized
company can issue shares without going to the
bank..., and that will help innovation.” (quote #02)
In all three jurisdictions, another strong common motivation for effective regulatory action was the protection
of their international reputation and “good standing” as a
financial service hub and an internationally credible
guardian against AML and CFT. Said a Malta legal advisor to the government,
“At the moment, this country unfortunately is subject to a lot of negative press relating to some
abuse in relation to money laundering and financing services. So, if you want to start fixing the situation, you see that this technology can help solve
that problem, then the faster you move, the better
the opportunity is.” (quote #03)
Finally, interviewees from all three jurisdictions
acknowledged that in the future and in order to remain
compliant, adjustments to the local regulations might become necessary as soon as major jurisdictions such as the
EU or the US establish their own legal DLT/Blockchain/Token frameworks. In this regard, some interviewees saw the EU and some of their member states moving
faster than the federal government of the United States
and some federal states within the union. Liechtenstein
interviewees, particularly, expressed some confidence
about their approach to potentially become the role model
for neighboring countries like Switzerland and Austria,
but potentially for the European Area as a whole.
In summary, while the regulatory approaches as
shown above vary to quite some extent, the motivations
of and the perceived challenges for regulating
DLT/Blockchain/Token service providers were seen in
very similar ways across the three jurisdictions. The ability to move fast due to small size and agility helped facilitate regulatory action geared at (1) preventing the abuse
and consequential annihilation of a potentially grand economic opportunity, (2) attracting and retaining serious
and solid players to a regulated and safe business environment, thus, capturing economic opportunity, (3) protecting the respective jurisdiction’s reputation, and (4)
fostering fundamental innovations by creating a ”token
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economy” with democratized access, and (5) serving as
a poster child for regulatory approaches of others.

5.3 Ad research question #3 (How are the identified
challenges addressed in the various approaches of early
regulations?):
Gibraltar had received a little under forty license
applications until the end of 2018, five of which had
been meticulously vetted and granted (Coinfloor,
Covesting, GBX—Gibraltar Blockchain Exchange, Huobi, and eToroX) by the Gibraltar Financial Services
Commission (GFSC), and the first three of those listed
had started regulated operations in the territory before
the end of that year. These licensees appear to meet the
criteria of business prowess and reliability. Since commencing operations the five licensees mainly have focused on providing exchange platforms for the trading
of cryptocurrencies. With the more specific token regulation still pending, it is currently unclear how the firstmover advantage will be fully captured and maintained.
By the end of 2018, with a staff of under one hundred
the GFSC had had dedicated a single digit number of
staffers to reviewing applications and to monitoring licensed DLT provider businesses. Since licensed DLT
provider services are expected to become increasingly
diverse and require highly sophisticated subject-matter
expertise for effective oversight on part of the regulator,
the hiring of new expert staff appears a midterm necessity. However, using the example of the gaming industry, the Gibraltar interviewees were in agreement and
fairly adamant that they were neither expecting and nor
inviting hundreds of applications but ultimately rather
more like dozens of solid DLT provider businesses operating from the territory. The current license holders
appeared to match these criteria also with regard to upholding Gibraltar’s good reputation. As one legal advisor maintains,
“Reputation is always key in these areas because
we want to be here for a long time. Not just shortterm venture where you make a lot of money and
then disappear. That I think has been the aim of
the regulator and the government as well. Certainly, we will feel comfortable with that too as
lawyers, knowing that everybody is thinking
alike, and we are looking for a similar kind of clientele that fit certain criteria.” (quote #04).
It remains to be seen though to what extent Gibraltar’s
regulatory approach can serve as a role model for other
jurisdictions, although elements such as the “nine principles” seem to resound in other legislative approaches (for
example, Malta’s VFAA, cap 590, p. 12) at least in part.
Liechtenstein, unlike the other two jurisdictions covered by this study, did not have DLT/Blockchain/Token
legislation in force at the time. However, the proposed

legislation appears to be well-integrated with existing
law, and in particular, with financial service-related legislation. In anticipation of the pending regulation and licensed on grounds of existing financial law, Binance, a
major player in the global cryptocurrency arena, has
launched a fiat-to-crypto exchange as a joint venture with
Liechtenstein Cryptoassets Exchange (LCX). By the
spring of 2019, The FMA had received over 250 license
applications, a few of which launched operations in a
sandbox-similar fashion under the auspices of the FMA.
However, the high number of application also seems to
indicate strong interest in the innovative potential of the
broader token economy as envisioned and facilitated by
the upcoming legislation and the guidance by the FMA.
As a Government Official points out,
“If you only look at the financial market regulation applications, there was really no need to actively change something because if you tokenize
a security, the security laws apply in Liechtenstein. Also, the financial market law applies to that
section. There is just the question about bitcoins
and utility coins that is open at the moment. But
we have seen there is a lot more potential in the
rest of the token economy. And if you want to tokenize a physical asset, if you want to tokenize a
car, a supply chain, and all the possible applications of the token in the industry besides the financial market. And that was the reason why we find
a broader approach to regulate.” (quote #05)
Once the legislation goes into force, it will be seen
how effective it is, how well the supervision by the FMA
works, and how it facilitates service innovation across a
large range of areas far beyond the financial sector. While
it appears wise to initially charter the FMA with the licensing task and the oversight, other supervisory entities
might need to become involved as the token economy unfolds. The Liechtenstein legislation shows some teeth
also with regard to specifying criminal infractions of the
regulation and respective punishments.
Malta, for reasons of too permissive handling of DLT
services already operating from its territory before the
regulation, and in particular, for lax enforcement of AML
and CFT measures, had come under serious pressure from
both the United States and the European Commission
[33]. As seen, the jurisdiction responded with establishing fairly detailed and comprehensive legislation, which
tried to strike a balance between stricter oversight and
maintenance of the innovative space it intended to provide. Licensees have to go through two licensing authorities, which cover the technology and the business side of
the application. The technology side is covered by MDIA,
a brand-new authority. For the business side, certified
agents had to be involved, which act as the subject matter
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experts on behalf of the MFSA. By spring 2019, however, only about a dozen VFA agents had been certified,
so that the applications from DLT/Blockchain/Token
businesses already in operation in the country under a
transitory regime since November 1, 2018 had still remained in an unlicensed or preliminary status. From that
end, the recent admonishment by the EC demanding
stricter oversight (see above) is coherent. In part, this
problem is also reflected in a lobbyist’s critical remark
about the regulation,
“Potentially, we over-regulated the whole thing,
and the reasons there, even though I think the intention was good, are many. One, the Malta Financial Service Authority did not want to take any
risks. You also need to factor in the international
climate or international perception, which Malta
managed to achieve in the past few years. We are
mentioned in the Panama Papers, where we are
seen as a tax haven etc. So, the MFSA had to build
something new, and they set the bar too high. It is
almost like having an initial public offering when
it is not like that. So, that might have killed that
industry per se.” (quote #06)
It appears that the current regulatory situation has not
yet effectively prevented abuses in the DLT provider
market, nor has it helped repair Malta’s currently stricken
reputation, although the ESMA Advice notice of January
2019 [2] explicitly refers to Malta’s regulation as to basically heading into the right direction; however, at the
same time the agency also points at the high failure rate
in VFA agent certifications.
In summary, the challenges of abuse prevention, business development, reputation management, innovation,
and role modeling in the rapidly evolving DLT/Blockchain/Token space are addressed in different ways by the
three jurisdictions. In the case of Gibraltar, based on a
regulation with some interpretive wiggle room, a highly
selective licensing regime is applied. Liechtenstein’s regulation appears to be the farthest reaching with the intent
of creating an entirely new token economy, while Malta’s
detailed and two-stage regulation appears to be influenced as much by remedial efforts and damage control as
by first-mover opportunity objectives. In that, the latter
might lack in part the attractiveness of the other two regulation regimes from a business perspective.

6. Discussion
Risk, Opportunity, and Regulation. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) along
with European counterparts such as the three ESAs, that
is, the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA) and

the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) have been vocal and clear in their repeated warnings against the risks incurred when investing
in cryptocurrencies and digital assets. That notwithstanding the market capitalization of the leading 100 virtual
currencies was estimated to have reached a volume of
$281.3b (https://coinmarketcap.com — accessed June 14,
2019). This volume cannot be explained just on grounds
of dirty funds and dirty sources of funds in the AML and
CFT sense. What this demonstrates, is that rather despite
all warnings tremendous appetite for risk and for capturing what is seen as a unique opportunity exists. As argued
elsewhere [28], regulating an unfolding technology-facilitated global economic innovation in a non-stifling fashion is by no means a trivial task, which, however, when
done smartly can create tremendous public value along
various lines. As seen in the findings to RQ#1 the early
regulations in the DLT/Blockchain/Token provider space
by the three small jurisdictions may come from a standpoint of strong self-interest in the first place, but it is rather also reflective of the necessity to provide guidance as
well as enforceable and safe pathways towards developing and entertaining novel business models and methods,
which, in fact, helps create public value.
From that perspective, it would be helpful if large jurisdictions such as the US and the EU also followed suit
and moved more quickly with developing respective regulatory frameworks. Issuing warnings is neither sufficient
nor good enough for a dynamic environment and clearly
articulated business need as this one.
Laws in Tension and Harmonization of Legislation.
When regulating the DLT/Blockchain/Token provider
space, existing laws might not only be in need of amendments, but they might rather also be in tension with any
given DLT/Blockchain/Token provider regulation. As
mentioned above [24], a case in point may be the EU’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which introduces the principle of extraterritorial applicability,
which increases the reach of this particular regulation
globally. While one can argue that via built-in cryptography the data and privacy rights of individuals are effectively protected in a Blockchain for the most part, the
technology itself powerfully and effectively defeats the
GDPR “right to be forgotten,” once the cryptographic
shield has legally or illegally been removed. Furthermore,
due to the inherently global nature of distributed technology ledgers, liabilities may be incurred under the laws of
involved jurisdiction, which are unknown, or even unknowable, to both the regulated DLT service provider and
the client. While it is illusory to hope that all such potential legal ambiguities and vagueries can ever be resolved
in a global context, it also demonstrated that some extent
of regulation harmonization might be conducive to
providing firm legal foundations for operating safely in
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the DLT/Blockchain/Token provider space as the findings from RQ#2 suggest.
Smart Contracts. As shown in part in the findings to
RQ#3, one of the most attractive, since dynamic, features of the token economy is the use of smart contracts.
Elsewhere, the implications of “law becoming code”
and “code becoming law” have been discussed [7].
When it comes to the regulation of DLT service providers, this particular aspect can be addressed in various
ways (for example, in Gibraltar and Malta, the principle
of fair and honest business conduct covers the issue in
an umbrella type of fashion). However, once it comes to
regulation enforcement and practical oversight, smart
contracts, and in particular, intelligent smart contracts,
which can change upon dynamically changing conditions, is not a trivial undertaking. Even if unlawful behavior in this context is finally detected, remedial action
might no longer be possible. Vetting the algorithmic
soundness by technically versed lawyers, which are currently hard to get by, might be a necessary requirement
at the outset. However, smart contracts, which entail and
use artificial intelligence (AI)-based algorithms might
be hard to evaluate both ex-ante and ex-post. In other
words, despite effective and widely harmonized regulations, some areas remain to be better understood in their
ultimate consequences.

7. Conclusion
This study’s object was to contribute to the deeper
understanding of DLT/Blockchain/Token service provider regulation and its potential effects. However, our
interest was not derived from a national or international
law perspective. We were rather interested in assessing
and evaluating three early regulatory approaches and understand the motivations behind these approaches, as
well as the challenges anticipated, and the expectations
held in these approaches. In general, this paper contributes to the knowledge of obstacles confronting innovative and potentially disruptive information technologies
and novel services built upon these. In particular, this
paper compares the motivations, challenges, and expectation of three small first-and-fast-mover jurisdictions.
The forerunner efforts of these three jurisdictions may
serve as role models and sounding boards for larger jurisdictions such as the EU and the US in their own regulatory aspirations on the subject matter. However, it appears as evident that harmonized regulation, at least to
some degree, across major jurisdictions would help the
token economy, as Liechtenstein phrased it, succeed
more swiftly and more safely.
Future research will expand the comparative study
by a number of other jurisdictions including Bermuda,
France, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland among
others. In a couple of years, it is planned to revisit the
three early mover jurisdictions and assess the landscape

of DLT/Blockchain/Token service providers and the effectiveness of the regulation comparing the perspectives
of the various stakeholders on it.
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